Sales in a new market generally follow a hockey-stick pattern: after commercialization, sales are very low for some time before there is a dramatic "takeoff" in growth. Reported sales takeoffs across products vary widely from a few years to several decades. Prior research identifies new firm entry or price declines as key factors that relate to the timing of a sales takeoff in new markets. However, this literature considers these variables to be exogenous and only finds unilateral effects. In this article, new firm entry and price declines are modeled as being endogenous. Thus, the simultaneous relationship between price declines and firm entry in the introductory period of new markets when industry sales are negligible is studied. Using a sample of new markets formed in the U.S. during the last 135 years, strong support for a simultaneous model of price and firm entry is found: price decreases relate to the competitive pressures associated with firm entry, and, in turn, firm entry is lower in new markets with rapidly falling prices. Furthermore, a key driver of firm entry during the early years of a new market involves the level of patent activity, and a key driver of price decreases is the presence of large firms. In contrast to the recommendations from other research, these results indicate that rapid price declines may further delay sales takeoff in industries by dampening new firm entry. Instead, rapid sales takeoffs in new markets come from encouraging greater innovative activity and the entry of large firms.
Introduction
The invention of a new product is only the beginning of what can be a long road to eventual widespread acceptance in the marketplace. For example, while personal computers were conceptualized in the 1950's, they became technologically possible only in the 1960's, and the first commercial product became available more than a decade later with the appearance of The personal computer industry exemplifies the general patterns of the evolution in new markets that has been documented by prior research (e.g., Mensch 1979; Gort and Klepper 1982; Utterback 1994; Klepper 1997; Golder and Tellis 1997; Kholi, et al. 1999; Agarwal and Bayus 2002; Geroski 2003) i . An initial incubation period between the invention and commercialization of a new innovation is followed by an introductory period of low sales and industry growth. The number of firms competing in the new market is low at the beginning, and a surge in new firm entry occurs before the market enters its growth stage. Industry prices generally start high and then decrease over time. Table 1 , for example, reports average annual sales penetration (where sales penetration is the ratio of annual unit sales to the observed peak sales) and average annual new firm entry (where new firm entry is the ratio of annual new entrants to the total number of competitors) during the introductory period for thirty new markets. Notable in Table 1 , however, is the considerable cross-sectional variation in activity during the introductory period in new markets (Agarwal and Bayus 2002) . For some product innovations like compact disc players, cellular telephones, radios, and turbojet engines, a large fraction of the competitors during the early years are new entrants. For others like dishwashers, electric blankets, and vacuum cleaners, relatively few firms entered during the initial years of the new market. Similarly, the rate of price declines varies significantly across markets, with some innovations actually having an increase in prices. For example, given dramatic increases in the quality of turbojet engines, prices actually increased during the early years after commercialization.
[insert Table 1 about here]
The received literature on the period before sales takeoff emphasizes new firm entry (e.g., Klepper 1997; Agarwal and Bayus 2002; Geroski 2003) or declining prices (Golder and Tellis 1997) as key factors affecting the likelihood of sales takeoff. However, these studies assume that new firm entry and prices are exogenous, and only find unilateral effects. In fact, the distinction and importance of "exogenous" vs. "endogenous" variables has been the subject of extensive discussion (e.g., Engle, et al. 1983) , concluding that any empirical analyses are conditional on the validity of the relevant exogeneity assumptions. That is, not properly accounting for endogeneity can lead to incorrect conclusions about the role and importance of any explanatory variables.
Thus, the published results fail to provide a complete explanation for the key phenomenon during the introductory period of a new industry when sales are negligible. Further, the crosssectional variation in these variables discussed above highlight the need to delve deeper into the workings of this early entrepreneurial period. Extant explanations for firm entry and price declines generally relate to established industries (e.g., Geroski 1995) , rather than newly introduced markets. For example, even though a positive relationship between firm entry and (lagged) industry profitability has been found, these results cannot be directly applied before sales take off since a relatively large number of firms rush in before (lagged) profits (and sales) are substantial (see Figure 1) . Thus, there exist research gaps related to the modeling of new firm entry and price declines as being (potentially) endogenous, as well as the implications of these (endogenous) factors on sales takeoff. Additional insights into this phenomenon can lead to more effective firm decisions that hasten the growth of new markets.
The cross-sectional variation in firm activity during the early years of a new market in which sales are relatively low is studied. In contrast to the existing literature, this article provides substantive insights into firm behavior behind the growth of new markets. Importantly, this study departs from previous research that considers firm behavior to be exogenous (i.e., Gort and Klepper 1982; Golder and Tellis 1997; Agarwal and Bayus 2002) . Instead, in the spirit of Moore, et al. (1991) a simultaneous system of equations in which new firm entry and price are endogenous factors is proposed. Empirically studying the introductory period of thirty consumer and industrial innovations that were commercialized in the U.S. during the last 135 years, feedback effects between price declines and new firm entry are found: price decreases are related to the competitive pressures associated with firm entry, and, in turn, firm entry is lower in new markets with rapidly falling prices. In addition, the level of innovative opportunity in the new market (i.e., growth in patent stock) is identified as a key driver of new firm entry, and the presence of large firms is shown to be a key driver of price decreases. Thus, prior research in this area is extended by providing an explanation for factors that determine sales takeoff such as new firm entry (Agarwal and Bayus 2002) or price declines (Golder and Tellis 1997) . The results in this article highlight a potential problem of prescriptions from extant work. For example, in contrast to Golder and Tellis (1997) this study implies that firms should not reduce prices too quickly in new markets. Unlike Agarwal and Bayus (2002) , the simultaneous model in this article allows an explanation: lower prices lead to less firm entry, which in turn, leads to longer sales takeoff times.
In the next section, a brief overview of existing literature on the determinants of sales take-off is provided, with the intent of identifying existing research gaps. In the second section, a theoretical framework for firm entry and price declines in new markets when sales are minimal is developed. The data and variables used in the empirical study are then described in the third section. The set of equations that form the empirical model is presented in the fourth section, and the estimation results are discussed. To explicitly link the model and results with the existing literature, in the fifth section the relationship between new firm entry, price, and the length of the introductory period in a new market (i.e., the sales takeoff time) is explored. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are in the final section.
Research Positioning
The emergence stage of new product markets has been systematically studied in only a few prior studies (Gort and Klepper 1982; Golder and Tellis 1997; Agarwal and Bayus 2002) .
These efforts are briefly reviewed to address both their contributions to our understanding of the industry life cycle prior to sales take-off, and to identify research gaps that exist in the literature. Table 2 provides a summary of the key findings.
[insert Table 2 about here]
The pioneering work by Gort and Klepper (1982) highlights the evolutionary pattern in the number of firms that enter and compete in a new market. Using data on 46 consumer and industrial product innovations, they depict the diffusion of innovations over time in terms of distinguishable stages. Importantly, they find an association between the type and rate of innovation undertaken in the market and the rate of firm entry in a new industry. While the emergence stage is not a primary focus of their study, Gort and Klepper set the stage for future efforts to investigate whether market takeoff times may be systematically determined based on key firm and industry characteristics. Golder and Tellis (1997) delve deeper into the issues related to sales takeoff in new product markets, with a focus on whether the timing of sales takeoff can be predicted. By studying 31 consumer durable innovations, their key finding is that price declines lead to shorter sales takeoff times, with the implication that firms interested in achieving sales takeoff in new markets should strive to encourage demand by reducing prices. Agarwal and Bayus (2002) examine the same issue, but instead take a primarily supply-side perspective. While acknowledging the effect of price decreases on sales takeoff, their study of 30 consumer and industrial product innovations focuses on the role of new firm entry in determining the timing of sales takeoff. Noting that firm takeoff systematically precedes sales takeoff, they find that higher rates of new firm entry lead to shorter sales takeoff times.
While the results of these prior studies seem intuitively appealing, they raise several issues that have not been currently addressed in the literature. In particular, prior work has failed to address why prices decrease prior to sales takeoff, or why firms enter a new market when sales are negligible. While the results found by Golder and Tellis (1997) Gort and Klepper (1982) and Agarwal and Bayus (2002) seem to suggest that it may be the latter phenomenon, but neither study explicitly addresses the causal aspects of the firm behavior prior to sales takeoff. Further, their work fails to address why firms enter prior to the sales takeoff, and the impact of price declines on their entry decisions.
There are two important limitations of prior research which is addressed in this article.
One, previous studies examine each major determinant of sales takeoff largely in isolation of the other, and treat them as exogenous factors. Two, by doing so, these studies fail to incorporate feedback effects of one factor on the other. We contend that such a research design may lead to erroneous implications for firm strategy. Indeed, sales takeoff may occur as a simultaneous consequence of the interaction between firm entry and price declines over time, thus requiring that the key variables be examined in a simultaneous model setting. Doing so also allows other key factors (such as innovative activity and entry by large firms) that are related to sales growth in new markets to be identified.
Theoretical Framework
An overview of the theoretical framework underlying this study is in Figure 2 . The existing literature is used to develop hypotheses related to firm entry and price declines in this section. Unlike prior researchers who have generally studied these hypotheses in isolated situations, these hypotheses are incorporated into a simultaneous equations model in which new firm entry and price changes are endogenous factors (see Figure 2 ). We are unaware of any similar simultaneous model for either new or established markets.
[insert Figure 2 about here]
Why do firms enter a new market?
Despite the difficult nature of quantifying expected profitability, several studies document a positive relationship between firm entry, past industry profitability and industry growth rates (e.g., Orr 1974; Acs and Audretsch 1990; Geroski and Schwalbach 1991) . In new industries however, many firms enter well before sales (or profits or industry growth) reach substantial levels (e.g., see Figure 1 ). Thus, conventional variables like current (or lagged)
profitability and industry growth rates will not be effective measures of the expected profit potential associated with a new industry. Instead, it is argued that the profit potential associated with a new market is signaled by factors such as innovative activity, development costs, and price declines. Each of these are discussed in turn ii .
Prior research emphasizes significant cross-sectional variation in innovative opportunities across markets, either due to innovative potential or to demand conditions (e.g. , Schmookler 1966; Mansfield 1968) . As noted by Gort and Klepper (1982) , Geroski (1989) , and Acs and Audretsch (1990) , industries with high levels of innovative activity tend to have high entry rates iii .
For the early period of new market formation before sales take off, there are several reasons for new firm entry to be positively affected by high levels of innovative activity. On the demandside, new entrants may perceive a higher profit potential in new markets with high levels of innovative opportunities due to greater prospects for product differentiation and niche marketing (e.g., Comanor 1967; Blair 1972; Baldwin, et al. 2002) . In addition, high innovative opportunities can lead to the resolution of uncertainty about consumer preferences for product features. Any resulting positive word of mouth can, in turn, increase the perceived profit potential associated with the innovation. Similarly, on the supply-side, uncertainty related to the technical means of satisfying these desires make it difficult for a potential entrant to accurately assess the profits associated with a new market (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Clark 1985; Klepper 1997) . Resolution of this uncertainty takes time, and typically occurs as new firms innovate (e.g., Mueller and Tilton 1969; Klepper 1997; Adner and Levinthal 2001) . In new markets, high innovation rates usually mean that the key product specifications will be defined and any technical issues will be quickly worked out (e.g., Greve and Taylor 2000) . Thus, both demand and supply considerations suggest that the perceived profit potential and resultant firm entry is likely to be higher in markets with higher levels of innovative opportunity iv . As a result, the following hypothesis is proposed.
H 1 : Firm entry is higher in new markets with higher levels of innovative opportunity.
The profit potential of a new market is negatively related to entry costs like advertising and R&D expenditures (e.g., Sutton 1991; . A fundamental premise of the industrial organization literature is that entry costs are a critical determinant of firm entry (e.g. , Sutton 1991; Church and Ware 2000) . While the strategic use of these investments to deter entry is not emphasized (e.g., Dixit 1980) , it is expected that a firm's entry decision will be influenced improvements rely on advancements in basic science and technology. Not surprisingly, some firms find these entry costs to be a strong deterrent. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed.
H 2 : Firm entry is lower in new markers that require higher development costs.
The profit potential of a new market is also determined by industry prices, i.e., falling prices in a new market will generally signal reduced profit opportunities (e.g., Lambkin and Day 1989; Geroski 1995; . Following Agarwal and Bayus (2002) , the early periods of new markets are characterized by outward shifting demand and supply curves. While sales increases in such circumstances, traditional economic theory suggests the effect on price is indeterminate.
If prices stay stable (or even increase), the profit potential remains high. Falling prices, on the other hand, signal to potential entrants that price skimming strategies (traditionally employed by firms due to the differences in price sensitivity across consumers; e.g., Dean 1976; Rogers 1995) are being used by existing firms and that strong competitive pressures are already at work in the market. The more rapid prices decline in a new market, the lower is the incentive to enter.
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed.
H 3 : Firm entry is lower in new markets with more rapidly declining prices.
In addition, research suggests that the above hypothesis may be moderated by the required development resources (e.g., Acs and Audretsch 1990; Audretsch 1995; Agarwal and Bayus 2002) . In markets with rapidly declining prices, firms may still be willing to enter if they believe that the revenue-cost differential is sufficiently high due to low development costs. In markets requiring relatively high development expenditures, firms may be willing to enter if they can expect price stability to offset the additional costs. On the other hand, it is expected that potential entrants will perceive that there are considerably lower available profits in new markets requiring high development costs and rapidly declining prices due to the dual pressures on the anticipated profits. As a result, the following interaction hypothesis is proposed
In new markets with rapidly declining prices, firm entry in markets requiring higher development costs is lower than in markets requiring lower development costs.
Why do prices decrease in new markets?
Unfortunately, the existing literature does not provide an internally consistent explanation for declining prices in the early years of a new market when sales are minimal (e.g., Lambkin and Day 1989) . For example, it has analytically been shown that optimal new product prices decline over time when demand approaches the market saturation level (e.g., Kalish 1988) or marginal costs decrease over time due to the experience effects associated with increasing cumulative volume (e.g., Kalish 1988; Krishnan, et al. 1999 ). However, both of these conditions require sizeable sales levels before prices significantly drop.
Several studies note that during the early, formative stages before sales take off, the customer base is generally composed of innovators and early adopters who are willing to pay higher prices than other consumers (e.g., Dean 1976; Rogers 1995) . However, the ability of an existing firm to engage in a price skimming strategy is dependent on the competition it faces.
While a monopoly strategy may be to reduce prices only to the extent that marginal revenue brought in by the more price sensitive consumers equals the additional costs, the presence of other firms will prevent this from occurring. Thus, the more competitors in a new market, the greater are the competitive pressures to decrease prices (e.g., Mueller and Tilton 1969; Lambkin and Day 1989; Klepper 1997) . Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed.
H 5 : Prices decline faster in new markets with higher firm entry.
Due to economies of scale, large firms have many potential costs advantages over small firms (e.g., Church and Ware 2000) . To the extent that a new market has many large firms, there may be greater benefits based on both increases in cumulative production experience v and scale economies (e.g., Gort and Klepper 1982; Cohen and Klepper 1996) . For example, the initial manufacturing of a new product is often accomplished on unspecialized machinery that can be very cost inefficient at low volumes of production (e.g., Klepper 1997; Geroski 2003) . The presence of large firms enhance the effect of learning curves and economies of scale;
additionally, large firms have lower costs associated with their financial transactions (e.g., lower interest rates), enabling them to acquire specialized capital and employ specialists which can lead to further increases in efficiency. These lower costs can then be translated into price declines in order to attract new customers or increase sales to the existing customer base. Consequently, the following hypothesis is proposed.
H 6 : Prices decline faster in new markets with more large firms.
Due to the relative primitiveness of the first products in a new market, significant development resources may be called for to fully meet customer demands (e.g., Klepper 1997; Agarwal and Bayus 2002) . New markets may also require extensive advertising and promotion to educate and inform potential customers about the benefits of the new innovation (e.g., Brown 1981). Widespread adoption of product innovations can also require the development of complementary products and services (e.g., Shocker, et al. 2004 ). In such situations, a price skimming strategy is often employed where prices are kept high so as to recover development expenses (e.g., Dean 1976; Bensanko and Winston 1990; Klepper 1996; Nagle and Holden 2002) .
In other words, new markets that require a lot of development resources should have prices that do not rapidly fall over time. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed.
H 7 : Prices decline faster in new markets that require fewer development resources.

Data and Variables
In this section, the data and key variables available are described. While the thirty innovations in this study come from Agarwal and Bayus (2002) , new data on patents and firm size were collected especially for this study. This set of innovations was constructed from various sources including scientific journals, chronologies, and encyclopedias of new inventions.
To be included, a consumer or industrial product innovation had to be deemed significant by experts in the field and result in an entirely new industry rather than simply be an improvement or minor subsection of an existing market. This set includes a diverse mix of important consumer and industrial innovations introduced in the United States between 1849 and 1984 that vary in their capital and technological intensiveness, and overlaps with those studied by other researchers (e.g., Gort and Klepper 1982; Golder and Tellis 1997) . Many of these innovations were introduced between 1905 and 1966, which is generally believed to be the most technologically progressive period in US economic history (e.g., Abramovitz and David 2000; Gordon 2000; Field 2003) . A set of consistent time-series data on the key variables was compiled. Based on information reported in Agarwal and Bayus (2002) , the introductory periods for each market are defined to be the time between commercialization and the year before the sales dramatically increases, i.e., the sales "takeoff" (see Table 1 ).
Following related research (e.g., Gort and Klepper 1982; Golder and Tellis 1997; Agarwal and Bayus 2002) , only "successful" innovations are considered. Note, however, the possible concern from this approach is somewhat mitigated by the fact that innovations historically exhibit a wide variation in length of the introductory period vi . Since several products in the sample take well over twenty years before entering the growth stage (e.g., see Table 1 ), innovations that could have been considered "failures" based on their very low sales in the early years are included in the sample. Thus, it is very difficult to distinguish whether a new market is a failure, or if the market has been observed long enough. For example, based on its negligible sales in the 1920's (over 10 years after its commercialization in 1911), the electric vacuum cleaner would have been deemed a failure if this data set was being assembled in 1925 (vacuum cleaner sales actually took off 23 years after its commercialization; see Table 1 ).
Annual data were gathered for these 30 new markets from a variety of published sources.
This information was then used to construct a cross-sectional data set for analysis purposes. The key variables in this study, their definitions, and descriptive statistics are in Table 3 .
[insert Table 3 about here]
Data for sales and average price were compiled from various sources used by other researchers, including Dealerscope Merchandising and Predicasts Basebook (e.g., Golder and Tellis 1997; Agarwal and Bayus 2002) . The annual prices for each product were deflated by the Consumer Price Index (consumer products) or the Producer Price Index (industrial products) to account for inflation and general productivity changes in the economy.
Information on the commercialization date, entry, exit and number of competing firms in any given year were primarily compiled from the Thomas Register of American Manufacturers, a source that has been used to study firm activities in new industries (e.g., Gort and Klepper 1982; Klepper 1997; Robinson and Min 2002; Agarwal and Bayus 2002) . Firm listings were subjected to several checks to ensure actual market entry rather than a renaming or relocation (e.g., see
Agarwal 1997).
To gauge firm size, the asset size class categories reported in the Thomas Register was used to identify large firms. "Large" firms are defined to be those with assets greater than $1.4M (in 1982 dollars) at the turn of the century, and over time, consecutive asset categories were added to the "large" firm definition to appropriately adjust for inflation.
Following numerous studies (e.g., Gort and Klepper 1982; Acs and Audretsch 1989; Agarwal 1998 ), information on patent activity was used to quantify the level of innovative opportunity in a new industry vii . There are several well-known problems with patent data (Griliches 1990 Before developing our statistical models, the causal direction between key measures was carefully considered xii . For brevity, the details are not reported here (but are available from the authors). In particular, there is significantly higher growth in patent activity before as compared to after the number of firms competing in a new market dramatically increases (t before-after =7.72; p<0.01). This suggests that patent activity leads to firm entry, and not vice versa.
Empirical Model and Estimation Results
Based on the discussion in Section 2, New Firm Entry and ∆Price are considered to be endogenous variables that form the following set of simultaneous equations. 
In specifying equations (1) and (2) [insert Table 4 about here]
Implications for the Sales Takeoff Time
In this section, the results are linked to those of Golder and Tellis (1997) and Agarwal and Bayus (2002) in which new firm entry and price were considered to be exogenous factors related to the sales takeoff time (i.e., the length of the introductory period). Following these researchers, a proportional hazards regression model is used to estimate the conditional probability of a sales takeoff. Letting h(t) be the hazard rate function of sales takeoff and γ 1 (t) be an arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard function, the timing of a sales takeoff is specified as:
log h(t) = γ 1 (t) + γ 2 ∆Price + γ 3 New Firm Entry + γ 4 Market Penetration + γ 5 R&D Costs + γ 6 R&D Costs x ∆Price + γ 7 Year Because the sample includes consumer as well as industrial innovations, a Market Penetration index is constructed as the ratio of cumulative sales at the year before sales takeoff to the observed peak sales. To take into account the endogeneity of New Firm Entry and ∆Price in equation (3), the estimated values from equations (1) and (2) are used.
The parameters in equation (3) are estimated using the partial likelihood method in the SAS PHREG procedure with the EXACT method to handle the tied events times (Allison 1995) . Table 4 . Next, the expected time to sales takeoff is calculated using the estimates of equation (3) in Table 5 (Model 4) with the newly updated ∆Price and New Firm Entry values.
Following Golder and Tellis (1997) , the time to sales takeoff is obtained by finding the year when the probability of no takeoff (i.e., survival probability) falls below 50% (Allison 1995) xv . For example, to determine the effects of an increase in innovative activity: (1) Figure 3 . Overall, it is clear that an increase in the proportion of large firms in a new market has the biggest impact on reducing sales takeoff times, followed by the growth in patent stock and R&D costs.
[insert Figures 3 and 4 about here]
The direct and indirect effects of ∆Price and New Firm Entry on sales takeoff times can also be considered. To determine the indirect effects of decreases in ∆Price on sales takeoff times, the following steps are used: (1) Table 5 are used. As indicated in Figure 4 (A), the effects of decreases in price on sales takeoff times are considerably different depending on whether the indirect effects are considered. If prices are (incorrectly) assumed to be exogenous, the results suggest that decreases in price are associated with quicker sales takeoffs. However, analyses of the indirect price effects show that decreases in price are actually related to longer sales takeoff times. The results in Tables 4 and 5 provide an explanation: while falling prices may generate additional sales (and is marginally associated with faster sales takeoffs), the implied reduction in potential profits is associated with lower firm entry, which in turn is related to longer sales takeoff times.
An analogous analysis of direct and indirect effects associated with New Firm Entry reveals that increases in firm entry are generally associated with shorter sales takeoff times (see Figure 4 (B)).
Conclusions
A primary motive for the present study is to increase our substantive understanding of firm entry and pricing behavior in new markets before sales take off. This study focuses on explaining the observed wide variation in firm activities during the introductory period of new markets when sales are minimal. To do this, a simultaneous system of equations in which new firm entry and price are endogenous factors is developed. The empirical analysis in this article provides strong support for this simultaneous viewpoint. Indeed, firm entry is found to be positively related to price decreases, and at the same time, price decreases are negatively related to new firm entry. This particular relationship between price and firm entry (i.e., a negative feedback loop) indicates that the attractiveness of a new industry eventually diminishes as more and more firms enter.
Contributions
A summary of this study and its contributions over the existing literature is in Table 2 .
While the key causal factors (price declines, new firm entry) related to sales takeoff have been identified in prior work, extant literature has treated these factors as being largely exogenous and independent of each other. By doing so, prior studies have failed to examine in detail the underlying factors that create growth in new markets, and the determinants of price declines and new firm entry. This study develops hypotheses that examine the causes of price declines and new firm entry, and in particular, the potential feedback effects that the two variables have on each other. By doing so, several new findings and insights are obtained. Table 4 , firm entry during the introductory period is driven by expected profits, which is mainly signaled by the patenting activity in the new market. High levels of innovative opportunities mean that the inherent market and technical uncertainty usually associated with new markets will be resolved relatively quickly, and that a new entrant can successfully compete by developing its own differentiated product offering. Importantly, this explanation for new firm entry into new markets when sales are negligible does not depend on current (or lagged) profitability or industry growth rates.
First, based on results for the New Firm Entry equation in
Thus, Agarwal and Bayus (2002) is extended by showing that while new firm entry may be deterred by falling prices, high levels of innovative activity spur firms to enter the new market.
Second, based on the results for the ∆Price equation in Table 4 , price declines in a new market are primarily driven by the competitive pressure associated with firm entry. These results help provide insights into the underlying causal framework for the findings by Golder and Tellis (1997) : price declines are not the result of strategic monopoly pricing behavior undertaken by a single or few firms prior to sales takeoff, but instead occur due to supply-side effects associated with new firm entry. As already noted, the number of competing firms in a new market is generally low immediately after commercialization; competition then rapidly increases so that a takeoff in the number of firms occurs before the end of the introductory period (see Figure 1) .
Increases in the supply-side capacity associated with firm entry causes an outward shift in the supply curve, which subsequently puts downward pressure on prices. Notably, this explanation for falling prices does not depend on cumulative sales or experience effects.
Third, the theoretical framework developed for the period before sales takeoff in a new market (Figure 2 ) is distinct from extant models that explain price declines or firm entry in the growth or mature stages of a market. Existing models for price declines in the later stages identify key drivers being either shifts from product innovation to process innovation as a market matures (e.g., Utterback 1994; Klepper 1996) , or production experience/learning curves (e.g., due to cumulative sales). Neither factor is applicable in the period prior to sales takeoff.
Indeed, an important contribution of this article is to identify the role of competitive pressure (due to firm entry) in causing price declines before sales takeoff. As mentioned earlier, this finding contrasts with the implicit assumption by Golder and Tellis (1997) that strategic monopoly pricing behavior is related to price declines. Similarly, while firm entry may be broadly related to expected profits regardless of whether the market is in the pre-sales takeoff, growth or mature stage, the measures of potential profit will clearly differ by stage in the product life cycle.
While conventional measures like lagged profits can readily be used after sales take off, measures of potential profit that can plausibly be used in the period before sales take off are identified.
Finally, there are important implications for firm strategy. As opposed to the recommendation by Golder and Tellis (1997) that firms should strive to reduce the prices they charge in new markets (a strategy most likely based on an assumption of strategic monopoly pricing behavior), our study shows that any conclusions regarding the effects of price on the timing of a sales takeoff crucially depend on whether the indirect effects of price and new firm entry are considered. In contrast to Agarwal and Bayus (2002) , rapidly declining prices in a new market are found to be associated with longer takeoff times when the indirect effects of price are considered. Unlike the analysis and recommendations of Foster, et al. (2004) , price is not the only significant driver of a sales takeoff. In particular, a managerial strategy of decreasing prices in an emerging market may have some unintended consequences, i.e., the sales takeoff may be delayed even further!
Limitations and Future Research Directions
As with all empirical research, generalizations of the conclusions beyond the data and measures analyzed should be done with care. At the same time, any study limitations offer opportunities for future research. Clearly, the theoretical framework needs to be tested in other industry settings as well as in international markets. An important direction for future research is to further refine the new firm entry and patent stock measures used in this study so that the supply-side effects (capacity increases and process improvements) are cleanly separated from the demand-side effects (product improvements). Several alternative measures of innovative opportunity might be considered (e.g., citation adjusted patents, R&D expenditures, new product announcements; see Hagedoorn and Cloodt 2003) . In addition, greater details of the activities of large and small firms, as well as the innovation strategies they employ (e.g., provisional patent applications, licensing, patent renewals) during the introductory period, may lead to further insights into the creation of new markets. Further information on firm characteristics, resources, and capabilities could also be helpful in gaining deeper insights into firm actions that lead to success in new markets.
While this study highlights the typical pattern of industry evolution in Figure 1 , the deviations of a few specific markets suggests that detailed industry case studies can also increase our understanding. For example, the fact that turbojet engine had increasing prices, increasing competition, and a relatively quick sales takeoff suggests that measures of product quality need to be refined and added in the analysis. In addition, a detailed study of the role of firm exit was beyond the scope of this study. An investigation of firm behavior related to early exit from emerging markets represents an important avenue for future research. In particular, longer sales takeoff times and sustained levels of higher prices can be associated with markets in which the early entrants prematurely abandon their innovation and product improvement efforts.
Finally, the findings in this article suggest that firm entry, together with the collective innovative activity of competing firms, is crucial to the creation of growth in new markets. A strategy by which a firm wants to encourage other firms to enter a new industry is entirely consistent with a real options viewpoint (e.g., Amram and Kulatilaka 1998) . By initially entering a new industry in a limited fashion, a firm takes an "option" to grow at a later time. Only after the market and technical uncertainty associated with the new innovation is resolved will the firm possibly exercise this option by significantly committing resources. In this case, the combined innovative activity of several (competing) firms reduces this uncertainty faster than the efforts of a single firm, leading to an explosion in firm entry and sales. Future empirical and analytical research might explicitly consider such a perspective to further explain how new markets are created. 
New Firm Entry
Average annual ratio of new entrants to the total number of competitors between commercialization and the year before the end of the introductory period (see Agarwal and Bayus 2002) 0.30 (0.20)
Large Firms
Average annual proportion of large firms present between commercialization and the year before the end of the introductory period 0.87 (0.14)
Patent Stock
Change 
R&D Costs
Average industry R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales (see Agarwal and Bayus 2002) 4.92 (3.34)
Year
Commercialization year 1939.83 (30.11) † Other measures such as the percentage change in price during the introductory period and a ratio of the price in year prior to the end of the introductory period to the initial price at commercialization were also considered (e.g., see Golder and Tellis 1997) . However, as suggested by the price pattern in Figure 1 , none of these alternative measures adequately captures the nature of the observed price trend. Because our interest is in an analysis of price trends across new markets, a single parameter that measures changes over the entire introductory period is most desirable. This is consistent with the approach of fitting an exponentially declining time trend. † † Cumulative patents follow an S-shape pattern over the entire product life cycle (Anderson 2001) . Because cumulative patents exhibit an exponentially increasing pattern over time during the introductory period, log(cumulative patent applications) is used. This approach also allows for the control of other effects such as Year and industry type (i.e., λ 1 + λ 2 Year + Industry Dummies[λ 3 + θ t]). Shane 2001a,b) . The emphasis in this article is on firm activities after the new market is "created" (i.e., after commercialization) but before the growth period (i.e., before sales takeoff).
ii Debruyne and Reibstein (2005) find that contagion effects between firms is a significant predictor of an incumbent's entry timing into a related (sub)market. In other words, an incumbent firm (with a product) is influenced by the number of "like" firms entering the (new) related market in making its own entry decision. This is not the situation studied in this article. Instead, this article centers on examining cross-sectional variation in firm entry across new markets.
iii Another possible hypothesis is that innovative activity increases the barriers to entry due to patenting and the protection of intellectual property (e.g., Church and Ware 2000) . However, studies have found that the spillovers of knowledge created due to innovative activity enable rather than limit entry (e.g., Arrow 1962; Blair 1972; Geroski and Pomroy 1990) . This is also consistent with empirical studies that find significant entry, even in capital intensive industries where scale economies are important (Smiley 1988; Acs and Audretsch 1990; Audretsch 1995) . For new markets, entry barriers also seem to be inconsequential since a number of both small and large firms enter most markets well before substantial sales are achieved (Agarwal and Bayus 2002; Geroski 2003) .
iv Here, the underlying cross-sectional variation in technologies and demand conditions that lead to different levels of innovative activity is emphasized, acknowledging that some firms innovate prior to entering a market (e.g., diversifying entrants) while other firms innovate after entering. Regardless of when firms undertake the innovative activity, the perceived profit potential for entrants is higher in markets with high innovative activity.
v Since overall sales in a new market is very low in the introductory period, these learning advantages are expected to be minor relative to later periods when there is substantial cumulative sales experience. However, to the extent that firms may benefit from learning advantages even at lows levels of output, they may experience cost savings.
vi In addition, the potential effects due to sample selection bias was explicitly considered by using a standard Heckman (1979) two-step Probit model (details are available from the authors). To do this, our sample of innovations was split into two groups based on the length of the introductory period, as well as the magnitude of sales takeoff. Results indicate that the sample selection bias correction term (inverse Mills ratio) is not significant, and more importantly, the conclusions reported in this article are robust.
vii Due to the non-trivial costs involved, patenting activity might also be a signal of firms' belief that the new market holds much profit potential. In this case, it would be expected that price and patenting activity are highly correlated (from H 1 ). However, there is no evidence to support this supposition since the correlation between Price and Patent Stock is only 0.10 and insignificant (p=0.60).
viii Given that a sample of innovations over the past 135 years is considered, patent weighting schemes involving citations are not feasible.
ix The class/subclass definitions used for each new market in the sample is available upon request. Since full-text search is only available for patents issued since 1976, manual searches of individual full-page images were used to determine the application dates for each patent application before 1976. Due to the large number of patents for some class/subclasses, a random sample of annual patents was used to estimate the patent stock distribution for five industries (automobile, dishwasher, computer printer, radio, sewing machine). As a robustness check, all of our models were also estimated using only the twenty-five industries with complete data. The empirical conclusions in this article remain unchanged.
x See National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Studies (1999), Research and Development in Industry, xi Consistent with Golder and Tellis (1997) and Agarwal and Bayus (2002) , other environmental variables such as World Wars (dummy variable), Great Depression (dummy variable), and GNP were not significant and thus are not reported here.
xii The standard approach of constructing temporally lagged explanatory variables is also employed, i.e., explanatory variables are measured at the year before the end of the introductory period (see Table 3 ).
xiii The instruments used include Patent Stock, R&D Costs, Large Firms, Large Firms x R&D Costs, and a dummy variable indicating when ∆Price was negative.
xiv Whether prices are a function of cumulative sales was also examined (i.e., whether prices decline due to learning or experience curve effects). Prices are found to not be related to sales volume during the introductory period; as expected however, prices are significantly related to log(cumulative sales) afterwards in the growth stage.
xv The survival function requires estimating a baseline survival function, which can be obtained by a nonparametric maximum likelihood method after estimating parameters in equation (3). Note that this nonparametric estimation is available only when there are no time-varying covariates, which is the case for this study (Allison 1995) .
